



The financial reform process referred to as "de-
regulation" in the United States is also occurring
in Japan, where it is called "financialliberaliza-
tion." Both processes share certain catalysts and
objectives, but the cultural, institutional, and
economic environmentsofthe twocountries
ensure significant differences in their respective
approaches tofinancial reform. This Letter outlines
the liberalization process in Japan and discusses
the importance of liberalization from the U.S.
perspective.
Japanese financial liberalization
Financial liberalization in Japan is focused on re-
structuring the domestic and international flow of
funds between lenders and borrowers to satisfy
betterthenew requirements ofeconomic growth
in the 1980s. Specific reforms, which officially
started in 1976, have been designed to increase
the role ofmarket forces by relaxing interest rate
constraints and broadening portfolio opportunities
for market participants; expanding existing secur-
ities markets and developing new securities
markets for both private and public debt; increas-
ing capital flows in and outofJapan; widening
access by foreign financial institutions toJapan's
financial system; and "internationalizing"theyen
with the objectiveof increasingJapan's role in the
international financial system.
Japan's financial system priorto liberalizationwas
highly constrained by regulation and administra-
tive guidance from the Ministry ofFinance (MOF)
and the Bank ofJapan (BOJ). Banks and other
financial institutions were subject to portfolio
restrictions, interest rate constraints on deposit
and lending activity, and restrictions on inter-
national transactions. Securities markets were
undevelopedsince governmentdeficits were small
and corporate borrowers relied almostexclusively
on large banks forshort- and long-term funding.
Thedomesticfinancial system was internationally
isolated via a complex set ofcapital controls,
restrictions on Euro-yen activity, and limited
access byforeign financial institutions.
The objectives ofthis highly structured, seg-
mented, and regulated system were to support
export-led economic growth, industrialization,
and high personal savings, and toprovideasimple
conduitfortransferring the large surplus offunds
in the personal sectorto the large deficit in the
corporate sector.
The objectives were well-served by the regulatory
system until the first oil-price shock of1973-74,
which marked the end ofrapid economic growth
in Japan. Real GNPgrowth declined from a 10
percentlevel tothepresent range of3to5percent.
The impactof reduced economic growth on the
flow offunds must be judged the most importaht
catalyst for financial liberalization forthree reasons.
First, theslowdown increased the sizeofthepublic
sector deficitsignificantly. Public sector deficits
had averaged about 2 percent ofGNP priorto
1973, but had quickly increased toover 7 percent
ofGNP by 1975. Rather than sell the increasing
volumeofgovernmentdebton the open market,
theMOFplaced thedebtdirectlywith a"captive"
syndicateofbanks and otherinstitutionsthatwere
required to purchase the debt at below-market
rates and to hold it for as long as one year. Syndi-
cate members did notresist the procedure priorto
1975 largely because the amountofdebtwas
small. Also, the BOJ was willingto repurchase the
debtfrom banks at prices that guaranteed no cap-
italloss, and the MOFallowed securities com-
panies to use the debtto support a repurchase, or
"gensaki," market as it is called in Japan. After
1975, when thesizeofthedebtrose, theMOF met
with increasing market resistance and was forced
to make anumberofconcessionstomarketforces,
which officially started the liberalization process.
Second, slowereconomic growth with concom-
itant reductions in profitopportunities and in the
need to expand plantand equipment meantthat
the corporate sector deficitdeclined significantly.
Corporate sector deficits have averaged about 6
percentofGNPpriorto 1973; theydeclinedtoless
than 4 percentofGNPafter 1975. The banking
system's market share dropped as a result ofre-
duced corporate demand for credit. And corpora-
tions becamemoreawareofalternativesourcesof
funding, particularly the managementoffinancial
assets as anewsourceofprofit. Banks thus became
advocates of increased flexibility as a means ofFRBSF
re-establishing and increasing their marketshare,
and corporations becameadvocatesofmorefund-
ing sources and more market-sensitive financial
assets.
Third, the household sector also broughtpressure
to liberalize the financial system. Priorto 1974,
households' alternativesfor investingtheirsavings
were restricted to a narrowset of regulated finan-
cial assets. For a varietyofreasons, theydid not
use the financial system as a majorsource ofbor-
rowing. Slowereconomic growth, however, in-
creased household awareness ofthe burdensof
being limited to investing wealth in regulated,
relatively low-yielding investments. In addition,
the changing age distribution ofthe population
toward older individuals increased the need to
manage financial assets for retirement.
Otherforces also were importantin bringing
pressure for liberalizingJapan's financial struc-
ture. The shiftfrom afixed to a floating exchange
rate system after 1973 brought pressure to end
restrictions on short- and long-term capital
movements in'and outofJapan. In addition,
deposit rate ceilings became seriously bindingon
the occasions when secondary market rates ex-
ceeded regulated rates. As well, advances incom-
putertechnology increased the ability offinancial
institutions to innovate and introduce new services
(such as cash dispensers and creditcards) and new
financial assets (such as combined demand/time
deposit accounts and government bond mutual
fund accounts).
Pressure from outside Japan recently has become
an important impetus to further liberalization.
Japan has been encouraged toopen its markets to
international competition, including its financial
system to access byforeign financial institutions,
and to take steps thatwill makethe yen an inter-
national currency likethedollar-onewidely
used to make international payments and which is
attractive as an investment vehicle forforeigners.
What has been accomplished
The financial reforms in Japan have been directed
toward four areas: intermediation finance, the
government bond market, the short-term money
market, and international finance.
In intermediation finance, banks have been
authorized to issue large CDs paying interest rates
that are responsive to market rates, to offer new
deposit accounts thatearn higher regulated rates
ofreturn, and to increase consumer lending.
Securities companies have been authorized to
issue bond fund accounts with limited transaction
features. Deposits, withtheexceptionoflargeCDs,
are still subject to interest rate ceilings. However,
the regulators have been willingto adjustceilings
more frequently to minimizethe spread between
marketand regulated interest rates. Mostofthe
controlsoverlendingrates previouslyenforced by
the regulators have been removed.
In the government bond market, the MOF has
permitted syndicate members to sell government
debt100daysafterpurchase, offered medium-term
government bonds publicly (at market rates), al-
lowed banks to make over-the-counter sales of
newgovernment issues, and narrowed the spread
between the market and issue rate on securities
soldtosyndicate members. Overall, the newissue
marketfor government bonds has become sensi-
tive to market forces.
In short-term securities markets, transactions in
the government bond repurchase market, orgen-
saki trade, haveexpandedgreatlysincethe market
was officially recognized in 1976. The volume of
CDs has grown quickly since their authorization
in 1979. Despite the lackofa new-issue Treasury
bill market, the shortened maturityofexisting
long-term debthas de facto established a short-
term government securities market. Finally, reg-
ulators have expanded participation in the inter-
bank money marketand largely freed itof interest
rate restrictions.
In international finance, liberalization has in-
creased access byforeign financial institutions
and relaxed oreliminated mostofthe restrictions
overcapital flows. The 1980 amendments to the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law
officially established the principlethat capital
flows in and outofJapan are notto be regulated,
and that controls will only be used in an
emergency to preventdisruptiveexchange rate
fluctuations. In addition, the environmentfor an
expanded Euro-yen market has been improved by
allowing nonresidents to issue Euro-
yen bonds, by removing the withholding tax on
non-residents holding Euro-yen bonds issued by
Japanese residents, and by allowingJapanese
banks and foreign banks to issue Euro-yen CDs.Ten years have passed since the initial efforts at
financial reform in Japan, and considerable prog-
ress has been made. Additional reforms, such as
establishing a bankers' acceptance marketand a
bond futures market, and removing interest rate
ceilingson largedeposits, are plannedforthe near
future.
Importancefrom the U.S. perspective
Financial reform in Japan has recently become an
issue in discussions between the U.s. and Japan
over international trade issues. In the May 1984
policydiscussions between the U.S. Treasury and
the MOF, the U.S. encouraged Japan to increase
the pace offinancial liberalization, especially
with regard to increasing access for foreign finan-
cial institutions toJapan's domestic markets, and
to take steps to increase the use ofthe yen in
international tradeand finance. The U.s. expected
afasterpaceofliberalizationto increasetheworld
demand fortheyen, and thus contributetoa lower
yen/dollarexchange rate as well as an increase in
U.S. exports offinancial services to Japan (by
makingJapanese financial markets more access-
ibleto U.s. institutions).
Some economists argue it is notcertain howthe
yen/dollarexchangeratewiII be influenced bythe
liberalization process in Japan. One study, for
example, concluded that some ofthe proposals
advanced foropening upthe Japanese financial
system, ifenacted, would increase the exchange
value ofthe yen whileothers would decrease it.
Otherstudies have reached a similarconclusion.
It is by no means clear, therefore, thatthedollar's
rise againsttheyen and othercurrencieswouId be
offset significantly by a faster pace ofJapanese
liberalization. Instead, theeffectsofhigh U.S. inter-
est rates and federal deficitswill continueto dom-
inate in determiningthe yen/dollarexchange rate.
Neither is itclear that giving U.s. financial institu-
tionsgreateraccess toJapanese markets will mean
agreaterexportofU.s. financial servicestoJapan.
Japan has changed its Banking Law to incorporate
the principlethat domestic and foreign banks are
to betreated equally. However, this has meantthat
foreign banksnowface competition in someareas
for which they previously held a privileged posi-
tion. The case ofimpact loans is a good example.
An impact loan is a loan to aJapanese resident
denominated in a foreign currency, which, until
recently, onlyforeign banks could make. As a
resultof liberalization, Japanese banks nowcom-
pete aggressively and mayhave an advantage in
being more familiarwith the needs ofJapanese
customers.
Despite these reservations, it is still true that there
are significant benefits to the U.S. from Japan's
liberalization process. The increased use ofthe
yen in international trade and finance will increase
Japan's role to a level commensurate with its
economicsize. Italsowill make itmorelikelythat
the U.S. andJapan will playajointrole in providing
a financial infrastructure forthe Pacific Basin
region, a region that shows signs ofbeingthe
world's majorgrowth center in coming decades.
Conclusion
There are important benefits to theJapanese from
amore liberalized financial system. The pre-liber-
alized financial system served Japan's needs for
the three decades after World War II. Itwas struc-
turally simple and provided an excellentconduit
for the transferofsizeable household savings to
large corporations in supportofexport-led eco-
nomic growth and industrialization. Since then,
Japan has become a major industrialized economy
that must face oil-price shocks, slowereconomic
growth, changing flows offunds, and increased
financial integrationwith the rest ofthe industrial-
ized world. Japanese regulators have recognized
the incompatibilityofthe previously constrained
financial system with the neweconomic environ-
ment, and have made progress toward creating a
freer, morecompetitive, and open financial system.
Despite the uncertainty overthe beneficial effects
ofJapanese liberalization on the yen/dollarex-
change rate and the U.s. balance on goods and
services, there is noquestion that the U.S. ulti-
mately stands to gain from a continuation ofthe
liberalization process.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










loans, leases and Investments1 2 189,617 - 13 11,140 6.2
loans and leases1 6 171,694 - 265 12,664 7.9
Commercial and Industrial 51,982 - 259 3,888 8.0
Real estate 62,815 - 16 2,849 4.7
loansto Individuals 33,767 186 6,115 22.1
leases 5,350 3 356 7.1
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,005 261 - 1,067 - 8.8
OtherSecurities2 6,918 - 9 - 456 - 6.1
Total Deposits 193,273 -4,423 8,677 4.7
Demand Deposits 44,103 -3,244 954 2.2
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,149 -1,118 1,297 4.4
OtherTransaction Balances4 13,583 - 949 1,456 12.0
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 135,587 - 230 6,267 4.8
MoneyMarketDeposit
Accounts~Total 43,310 - 281 3,693 9.3
Time Deposits in Amountsof
$100,000or more 38,699 69 714 1.8
Other liabilitiesfor Borrowed-MoneyS 22,954 2,157 1,717 8.0
Two Weel< Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, SuperNOWand savings accountswith telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&lnotes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percentchange